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Abstract
Author similarity and detection is an integral first step in detecting state-led disinformation campaigns in an
automated fashion. Current detection techniques require an analyst or subject matter expert to hand-curate accounts.
Stylometric features have a rich history in identifying authorship of unknown documents, but little exploration has
been done to compare authors to one another. We have adapted a select handful of stylometric features for use in
author similarity metrics, and show their >0.96 F-1 performance on a curated author classification task, across
both traditional machine learning and deep learning models. These features should contribute to the expanding
field of author similarity research, and expedite the process of detecting and mitigating large-scale social media
disinformation campaigns.
I. Introduction
In 2016, the Russia-based Internet Research Agency
(IRA) conducted a multifaceted information warfare
campaign at the direction of the Russian government [1,
2]. By posting a massive volume of falsified and de-
ceptive information across a spectrum of social media
and other online platforms, IRA operatives worked to
undermine Americans faith in the 2016 U.S. electoral
process and government institutions, as well as exacer-
bate political polarization by exploiting cultural and so-
cietal divisions [1, 3, 4]. Ongoing examination of these
influence campaigns show evidence that not only has
Russia continued to use this tactic to support their pol-
icy narratives and objectives, but that other state and
non-state actors are emulating these tactics for their
own use [1, 3]. Since the events of 2016, Twitter [5]
and other social media platforms such as (but not lim-
ited to) Instagram, Facebook, and Tumblr [1,4,6] have
collected and published evidence of the IRAs efforts
to manipulate and deceive audiences both inside and
outside of the United States. Detection of troll-like
user accounts is a first step in uncovering larger state-
sponsored adversaries that are attempting to erode pub-
lic trust in democratic institutions and processes. Un-
covering these users, though, is currently a time- and
labor-intensive process that relies on analysts, subject
matter experts, or content moderators evaluating ac-
counts by hand in an effort to discover adversary nar-
ratives and map troll dissemination networks. Many
accounts, in order to evade detection, engage in the
process of persona-building, or posting otherwise harm-
less materials to help establish their footprint as a le-
gitimate account before publishing their deceptive or
manipulative payload [1]. This can make it difficult to
detect accounts of interest using solely content-based
metrics.
There is a large body of work in authorship attribu-
tion through use of stylometrics [7–14], a field which at-
tempts to match documents of unknown origins to their
author. Stylometrics applies features like frequency of
specific punctuation and n-grams, number of characters
and words, part of speech usage, vocabulary diversity,
and spelling and grammatical errors. Stylometry, how-
ever, has only just begun to be applied to the field of
author similarity detection [15–17], though it has been
proposed as early as 1987 with PCA [18,19].
We believe that by applying stylometric features
to text and incorporating them into machine learning
pipelines, we will be able to accurately predict certain
behaviors or qualities of relevance to national security.
This would increase the speed and precision by which
analysts may identify problematic accounts, and allow
institutions to counter these information warfare cam-
paigns in a more timely and effective manner. Stylo-
metrics are also inherently devoid of metadata and, as
such, they are platform-agnostic; that is, a fully-realized
model should be able to detect similar users across plat-
forms.
In this work, we focus on binary classification of Twit-
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ter data as a proof-of-concept for the use of stylomet-
rics on author similarity tasks; we explore a custom
troll/not-troll dataset, which shows high performance
across multiple machine learning models. We also high-
light current data limitations for author similarity tasks,
and consider which models and stylistic features are
most appropriate going forward.
II. Troll / not-Troll Dataset
We developed a binary classification dataset: troll au-
thors and non-troll authors. For the positive (troll) au-
thors, we used the dataset released by Twitter [5] which
contained tweets the platform attributed to the IRA’s
information warfare campaign directed against the 2016
presidential elections. The IRA dataset contains tweets
from known IRA trolls, including many tweets of “in-
nocent” persona-building as well as more nefarious and
divisive tweets (narrative payloads). Overall this class
had over 53 million English tweets across 2,560 users.
The negative (not-troll) authors were taken from a gar-
den hose Twitter drip over five days of July 2019. This
class had over 21 million English tweets across over
125,000 users.
Overall we found this dataset to be adequate to show-
case the performance of our novel author similarity fea-
tures and to compare multiple analysis methods. How-
ever, due to several assumptions made on the part of
the authors, some limitations may exist in the dataset.
We assumed that troll-like behavior was not present or
otherwise negligible in the garden hose data. We also
assumed that weighing the models’ loss functions for
the different classes would account for the extreme im-
balance in the number of authors for each label, and
that the imbalance in the number of tweets would not
affect performance. The final assumption is that the
two sources are similar enough to merge, even given
the multi-year gap between them.
III. Features
III.1. Readability
There are many instances where an author’s writing
ability and command of the English language can be
informative. Non-native English speakers may have a
more limited vocabulary [20], or make common gram-
matical and spelling errors [21]. Intuition would also
suggest that a human author would write at about the
same level, regardless of the topic, platform, or user
account that they were currently using.
We propose using the following readability metrics
as features, all intended to (roughly) represent reading
grade level from 0–12, in our author similarity task:
• The Dale-Chall readability formula [22] (DCRF):
DCRF =
0.1579
(
difficult words
words
× 100
)
+0.0497
(
words
sentences
)
+
{
3.6365 if difficult words
words
> 0.05,
0 else
,
(1)
where “easy” words are from a 3,000-word pre-
determined list [22], and “difficult” words are all
those which are not easy.
• The Automated readability index [23] (ARI):
ARI = 4.71
(
characters
words
)
+ 0.5
(
words
sentences
)
− 21.43
(2)
• The SMOG index [24]:
SMOG = 1.043
√
polysyllables ×
30
sentences
+ 3.1291,
(3)
where “polysyllables” refer to words which have 3
or more syllables.
• The Gunning fog index [25] (GFI):
GFI = 0.4
[( words
sentences
)
+ 100
(
complex
words
)]
,
(4)
where “complex” words are those which are both
polysyllables, as defined by SMOG, and are diffi-
cult words, as defined by DCRF.
• The Coleman-Liau index [26] (CLI):
CLI = 0.0588
(
letters
words
)
− 0.2996
(
sentences
words
)
− 15.8
(5)
• The Flesch Kincaid grade level [27] (FKGL):
FKGL = 0.39
(
words
sentences
)
+ 11.8
(
syllables
words
)
− 15.59
(6)
• The Linsear write formula [28] (LW):
LW =
LWr
2
−
{
1 if LWr > 20,
0 else
, (7)
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where the provisional result, LWr, is given by:
LWr =
2× brachysyllables + 3× polysyllables
sentences
, (8)
where “brachysyllables” are words with 1 or 2 sylla-
bles, and “polysyllables” are words with 3 or more
syllables.
• The text standard (µ˜), as defined by the mode of
the above tests:
µ˜ = mode
(
DCRF,ARI, SMOG,GFI,
CLI,FKGL,LW
) . (9)
We use the mode to filter out extreme values and
accurately represent the models’ consensus.
III.2. Lexical
A person’s lexicon and use thereof should remain con-
sistent, regardless of topic. We identified several lexical
features to use in our author similarity model:
• Statistics on a user’s post length; the minimum,
mean, median, and maximum number of characters
were each used as individual features.
• The minimum, mean, median, and maximum num-
ber of unique words in a post.
• The author’s overall minimum, mean, and maxi-
mum word length.
• 1,000 features from what we are calling the “Bur-
rows’ Z” metric, described in detail in Section III.4,
which effectively captures an author’s unique lex-
ical fingerprint, as compared to other authors in
the corpus.
III.3. Syntactic
As with lexical features, a person’s use of language
should remain consistent, even across varied topics. We
calculated syntactic features for each post, and aggre-
gated them at the author level in an attempt to capture
this effect. Author aggregations were the minimum,
mean, median, and maximum across all of their post
features. We calculated the post features as:
• Punctuation density (number of punctuation to-
kens divided by total number of tokens)
• Word density
• Digit density
• Special token (e.g. emoji) density
• Stop word density
• Meaningful word density
• Parts of speech densities; that is, for every present
part of speech (e.g. “adverb”) the number of its
occurrences divided by the number of words
We have provided exact definitions for each of these
categories as outlined in Section III.4.
III.4. Technical Details
For all models, all text was converted to lowercase,
and tokens were separated from the text based on
whitespace. Non-alphabetic characters were treated as
separate tokens. Token classification was done with
the Python 3.6 string [29] library: punctuation to-
kens were considered to be any with a first character
present in punctuation, word tokens with first char-
acter in ascii, and digit tokens with first character
in digits. Special tokens were defined as any token
present that was neither punctuation, word, nor digit.
Stop words were any word token present within the En-
glish list provided by nltk’s [30] corpus.stopwords.
Meaningful words were any word token not within the
stop word list. Part of speech tags were calculated us-
ing nltk’s [30] pos tag, with only word-labeled tokens
passed to the parser. Words’ syllables were calculated
with the pyphen [31] package. Sentences were counted
approximately, by summing the number of “.”, “?”, and
“!” special characters in each message. We forced a min-
imum count of one sentence.
We additionally developed a set of 1,000 lexical fea-
tures (given in Appendix I) adapted from Burrows’
Delta method [32], which has been routinely used in
author identification tasks. We call this feature set Bur-
rows’ Z, defined as the element-wise Z-score for author
a:
Za = (Xa − µ)⊙
[
1
σ0
, . . . ,
1
σn
]
, (10)
where µ is the element-wise mean of all Xa, σ is the
element-wise standard deviation of the same (a vector
from σ0 to σn), ⊙ is the element-wise multiplicative
operator, and each Xa is defined by
Xa =


Pa(w0)
Pa(w1)
...
Pa(wn−1)
Pa(wn)


, (11)
where Pa(wi) is the fraction of author a’s words that
are wi. EachXa is calculated with the n most-common
words in the corpus; in our case we chose the top 1,000.
Calculating the Burrows’ Z-score in this manner has
several important side-effects. Firstly, the corpus is nor-
malized by author vectors, Xa, so that all authors are
equally weighted within µ, regardless of the number of
posts in the corpus. Secondly, each feature, Pa(wi), is
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scaled by the standard deviation, σi, to better differ-
entiate usage at the tails of the distribution. Finally,
scaling by the mean and standard deviation of each fea-
ture means that all of the features lie on the same scale,
regardless of the frequency of their use within the cor-
pus.
All features (readability, lexical, and syntactic) were
de-skewed using the Yeo-Johnson [33] transform, as im-
plemented by sklearn [34], and then scaled to a mean
of 0 with a standard deviation of 1.
IV. Experiments
IV.1. Statistical Models
We built and optimized three independent machine
learning models: random forest, support vector ma-
chine (SVM), and extreme gradient boost (XGBoost)
decision trees, as implemented by sklearn [34] and
xgboost [35], respectively. All models used balanced
class weights, such that each class contributed equally
to the loss.
We tuned the model hyper-parameters on the
troll/not-troll dataset using Ray/Tune 0.7.3 [36] with
1,000 trials for each model. Each trial had parame-
ters randomly selected from pre-determined distribu-
tions given in Table 1. The final parameters were taken
from the best models, as defined by macro average F1-
score on validation data, and given in Table 2.
Model Parameter Range
Random Estimators Z ∈ [20, 1000]
Forest Max. features {log, sqrt}
Max. depth Z ∈ [10, 110]
Min. sample leaf Z ∈ [1, 5]
Min. sample split Z ∈ [2, 10]
SVM Kernel {linear, rbf}
*Penalty param. R ∈ [1e−1, 1e3]
XGBoost Estimators Z ∈ [20, 1000]
Max. depth Z ∈ [1, 20]
*Learning rate R ∈ [1e−4, 1e−1]
*Gamma R ∈ [1e−4, 1e0]
Deep Batch size Z ∈ [8, 64]
Learning Nodes per layer Z ∈ [16, 128]
Hidden layers Z ∈ [0, 16]
*Learning rate R ∈ [1e−5, 1e2]
Table 1: Parameter ranges used during hyper-parameter
tuning of all models. All parameters were sampled from
a random uniform distribution except where noted with an
asterisk (*), which indicates a log-uniform distribution. In-
teger parameters are represented by the letter Z, and real-
valued numbers by R. Square brackets indicate that all num-
bers within the range were considered, including both end-
points. Curly braces indicate that the possible values were
a set of equally-likely non-numerical choices.
We constructed a fourth model, an ensemble voting
classifier, using sklearn [34]. The model used each of
the previous three models as sub-models, each imple-
mented with its best hyper-parameters and weighed by
its tuned performance, as defined by macro average F1-
score, given in Table 3. The voting was conducted with
soft voting, meaning that each model’s probability of
a given prediction were taken into account during the
voting.
IV.2. Deep Learning Model
We created a deep learning model with densely-
connected layers using PyTorch 1.2.0 [37]. We used
the ReLU activation between each layer. Our final ac-
tivation was a sigmoid function, and our loss function
was binary cross-entropy, which we weighed such that
each category (e.g. “troll” or “not-troll”) contributed
equally to the loss, regardless of any data imbalance.
We optimized using the Adam [38] optimizer, using be-
tas of 0.9 and 0.999, epsilon 1e−8, and weight decay
0.
We refined the model hyper-parameters using
Ray/Tune 0.7.3 [36] to perform a meta-parameter
search on 32 (troll) trials with parameter selection cri-
teria given by Table 1. Trials were stopped early if the
test loss rose above 1.0 or at 10 epochs, whichever oc-
curred sooner. We chose the final parameters, given in
Table 2 from the trial epoch with the highest macro
average F1-score.
Best
Model Parameter Value
Random Estimators 346
Forest Max. features sqrt
Max. depth 10
Min. sample leaf 4
Min. sample split 4
SVM Kernel rbf
Penalty param. 1.0e0
XGBoost Estimators 705
Max. depth 4
Learning rate 9.0e−2
Gamma 3.4e−1
Deep Batch size 61
Learning Nodes per layer 118
Hidden layers 6
Learning rate 5.6e−4
Table 2: The best meta-parameters for each model, as opti-
mized on the troll/not-troll dataset. The best models were
defined as those having the highest macro average F1-score.
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Macro Macro Macro
Model Precision Recall F1-score
Random Forest 0.99 0.90 0.94
SVM 0.91 0.92 0.92
XGBoost 0.99 0.93 0.96
Voting 0.99 0.90 0.94
Deep Learning 0.96 0.91 0.93
Table 3: Performance results for all tuned models on the
troll/not-troll dataset. Precision can be thought of as the
true positive rate, and recall as the detection rate. Both are
reported as the macro average, which is the mean of both
troll and not-troll performance (equally weighted). The F1-
score is the harmonic mean of precision and recall. XGBoost
out-performs all other models on all measures.
V. Results and Discussion
Performance results across all models are given in Ta-
ble 3. Extreme gradient boost (XGBoost) out-performs
all other models across all metrics, and all of the
statistic-based models out-performed the deep learning
model. This is likely due to the deep learning model
overfitting the data very quickly– almost all parameters’
F1-score peaked at only one epoch. Overfitting would
likely be slowed by much smaller learning rates, but it is
unlikely that the final performance would out-perform
that of XGBoost. For the troll/not-troll dataset, we
recommend using the XGBoost model, as it is the most
performant.
Our performance is quite high, despite our imple-
menting several readability features in Section III.1 in
a crude fashion. For instance, the SMOG index was
normalized on texts of 30 sentences, a length which we
were unable to match given the short-message format of
Twitter. We also made two concessions in favor of scal-
ability: while matching against the “easy” word list for
Dale-Chall and Gunning fog, we eschewed the require-
ment that words be compared against their base form.
We forwent accurate sentence delineation, instead elect-
ing to count sentences based on quantity of punctua-
tion. As we are measuring author similarity and not
grade-level reading, we are not so much concerned with
the accuracy of a given readability score, so much as
consistency and reproducibility, which our features pro-
vide. Indeed, the high performance of all models on
the troll/not-troll dataset indicate that our feature se-
lection was appropriately predictive for this data.
It is possible that our models over-performed due
to the inherent structure of our data set, having been
joined from two disparate sources. For instance, the
word “epstein” was trending in the garden hose data
(8,171 uses) but not in the IRA dataset (202 uses),
which could be used to create very accurate labels based
on the time period difference, but not necessarily on the
users. Most words, however, did not appear to be repre-
sentative of a given time frame. On a surface level, these
words can appear to be quite mundane, but still highly
predictive of troll-like behavior (i.e. “sports,” “local,”
or “news”). Many stopwords, which are by definition
not correlated to any particular time event, were also
indicative of trolls (i.e. “after,” “against,” or “over”).
Other stopwords were anti-correlated with troll-like be-
havior (i.e. “dont,” “been,” or “ve”), which we hypothe-
size is due to language mastery, specifically with regard
to contractions. Overall, these seemingly-benign words
show some of the underlying structure of the troll-like
narratives, and in a manner detectable by our features.
Our approach provides a solid foundation for author
similarity detection, even with a noisy data source.
VI. Conclusions
High-volume author similarity and detection techniques
are critical, not only in research applications, but with
grave national security consequences. Through the
course of this study, we showed how the study of sty-
lometrics, mostly used for author attribution, could be
successfully adopted for author similarity and detection
tasks. Our classification models were highly performant
on our stlye-based features, independently of model se-
lection and implementation. Our results could be some-
what inflated due to the incongruence of our data set:
for future work, we heartily recommend more balanced
data all taken within the same context and time period.
Author similarity models should help not only pre-
vent future adversary-sponsored attempts at election
interference, but also in detecting other coordinated at-
tempts to sow discord, undermine civic trust in gov-
ernment institutions and processes, and propagate ad-
versarial policy objectives and narratives. Stylometric
features, specifically, are inherently well-suited to cross-
platform research and threat detection; they are not
limited to one social media website’s metadata format.
As more robust datasets for author similarity emerge,
we expect to see stylometric features increase in promi-
nence. More complex features, such as bigrams, gram-
matical errors, and usage anomalies, should be inves-
tigated. We also hope to explore multilingual models
in order to remove the current requirement of English-
only text when threats exist world-wide. Finally, with
more refined data, features, and models, we would hope
to accomplish true author detection tasks. In particu-
lar, pinpointing a specific human with multiple user ac-
counts, rather than this first elementary step of binary
classification.
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Appendix I: Top 1,000 words in
troll/not-troll dataset
All word tokens used in the calculation of Burrows’ Z.
The number of uses (counts) are the number of times
that token (regardless of case) appeared in our troll
corpus. The troll percentage is the percentage of usages
by positively-labeled trolls. Trolls accounted for 72.00%
of the word tokens in the corpus. We also show the
percentage points from random chance for each word
token. Stopword tokens are indicated in bold.
word token number
of uses
troll per-
centage
points
from
random
(72.00)
foke 28,633 100.0 +27.99
fukushima2015 14,575 100.0 +27.99
fukushimaagain 9,318 100.0 +27.99
blicqer 8,795 100.0 +27.99
giselleevns 7,463 100.0 +27.99
danageezus 7,210 100.0 +27.99
blacklivesmatter 15,236 99.94 +27.93
topnews 16,425 99.92 +27.92
uthornsrawk 8,502 99.88 +27.88
lsu 7,794 99.80 +27.80
sanjose 8,284 99.80 +27.80
pjnet 10,601 99.76 +27.76
enlist 6,302 99.66 +27.66
showbiz 10,927 99.62 +27.62
newyork 13,795 99.62 +27.62
workout 44,690 99.47 +27.47
cleveland 12,268 99.33 +27.33
sports 105,633 99.23 +27.22
tcot 14,141 99.21 +27.21
talibkweli 6,697 99.17 +27.17
ukraine 12,800 99.00 +27.00
exercise 15,376 98.71 +26.71
fatal 6,506 98.63 +26.63
baltimore 11,477 98.45 +26.45
politics 85,456 98.29 +26.29
kansas 7,637 98.28 +26.28
mt 6,410 98.20 +26.20
shooting 26,920 98.02 +26.02
syria 10,845 97.93 +25.93
obamacare 7,675 97.90 +25.90
local 62,112 97.89 +25.89
charlottesville 6,434 97.77 +25.77
suspect 12,981 97.77 +25.77
nfl 12,724 97.64 +25.64
midnight 13,504 97.45 +25.45
news 280,799 97.36 +25.35
injured 10,135 97.27 +25.27
chicago 37,828 97.22 +25.22
cruz 7,177 97.21 +25.21
crash 16,080 97.12 +25.11
isis 18,457 96.98 +24.98
hillary 41,684 96.95 +24.94
entertainment 11,457 96.80 +24.80
comey 8,482 96.80 +24.80
nuclear 13,218 96.65 +24.65
token count troll % points
baseball 9,326 96.63 +24.63
texas 31,408 96.61 +24.61
dies 12,687 96.59 +24.59
cops 12,978 96.36 +24.36
orleans 11,948 96.18 +24.18
arizona 6,392 96.05 +24.05
foxnews 11,284 95.79 +23.79
bush 7,075 95.63 +23.63
police 75,410 95.61 +23.61
christmas 8,027 95.58 +23.58
stocks 6,649 95.47 +23.47
weight 10,565 95.25 +23.25
county 16,190 95.19 +23.19
san 17,726 95.14 +23.14
officer 14,784 94.97 +22.97
obama 74,987 94.85 +22.85
ohio 7,790 94.82 +22.82
charged 13,819 94.54 +22.54
islamic 7,552 94.43 +22.43
driver 7,962 94.43 +22.43
clinton 37,896 94.29 +22.29
north 17,414 94.18 +22.18
gun 14,372 94.16 +22.16
debate 9,847 93.95 +21.95
health 36,862 93.95 +21.95
cop 9,530 93.92 +21.92
russia 18,950 93.71 +21.71
ban 9,232 93.59 +21.59
march 6,747 93.59 +21.59
teen 10,333 93.51 +21.51
rap 14,825 93.44 +21.44
environment 6,852 93.38 +21.38
budget 6,661 93.37 +21.37
sanders 8,700 93.10 +21.10
loss 8,435 93.05 +21.05
maga 23,924 92.95 +20.95
rally 9,212 92.94 +20.94
breaking 58,196 92.92 +20.92
turkey 6,787 92.91 +20.91
officers 7,232 92.78 +20.78
shot 24,120 92.73 +20.73
fired 7,542 92.66 +20.66
trial 7,285 92.57 +20.57
murder 12,366 92.36 +20.36
houston 7,067 92.27 +20.27
viral 6,304 92.24 +20.24
coach 6,589 92.16 +20.16
business 39,739 92.09 +20.08
tech 15,139 92.08 +20.07
killed 29,967 92.07 +20.06
islam 6,460 92.04 +20.04
quote 13,455 91.84 +19.84
fbi 13,250 91.81 +19.81
louisiana 7,953 91.72 +19.72
schools 6,468 91.65 +19.64
hillaryclinton 7,547 91.51 +19.51
east 8,590 91.46 +19.46
mayor 9,826 91.42 +19.41
liberals 10,648 91.40 +19.40
student 8,357 91.39 +19.39
university 6,431 91.36 +19.36
students 8,955 91.22 +19.22
nyc 13,946 91.20 +19.20
1
token count troll % points
fire 25,081 91.17 +19.17
terror 6,619 91.08 +19.08
california 13,457 91.01 +19.01
senate 12,432 90.98 +18.98
governor 6,586 90.98 +18.97
crime 17,708 90.96 +18.96
arrested 19,781 90.77 +18.77
science 7,753 90.54 +18.54
protesters 6,330 90.45 +18.45
korea 11,232 90.44 +18.44
near 12,701 90.39 +18.39
guilty 8,387 90.34 +18.34
death 24,971 90.28 +18.28
violence 9,990 90.18 +18.17
football 8,543 90.05 +18.04
wins 9,307 89.94 +17.94
accused 12,238 89.93 +17.93
reports 9,046 89.78 +17.78
plans 8,089 89.76 +17.76
http 16,494 89.75 +17.75
hospital 6,548 89.70 +17.70
state 39,911 89.66 +17.66
protest 7,579 89.64 +17.64
russian 10,814 89.49 +17.49
west 12,474 89.45 +17.45
florida 8,024 89.34 +17.34
bill 24,629 89.23 +17.23
arrest 7,988 89.23 +17.23
muslims 7,414 89.20 +17.20
officials 11,239 89.12 +17.12
claims 9,812 89.11 +17.11
study 7,406 89.08 +17.08
usa 19,999 89.06 +17.06
liberal 10,730 89.04 +17.04
presidential 7,821 88.99 +16.98
charges 9,103 88.93 +16.93
gov 7,053 88.91 +16.91
refugees 8,155 88.90 +16.90
dead 25,009 88.82 +16.82
threat 7,315 88.81 +16.81
calls 15,508 88.73 +16.73
poll 9,948 88.70 +16.69
john 15,772 88.60 +16.59
supporters 8,583 88.52 +16.52
college 10,025 88.41 +16.41
washington 9,692 88.41 +16.41
school 26,209 88.30 +16.30
car 20,274 88.16 +16.16
search 6,683 88.14 +16.14
drug 8,273 88.11 +16.11
judge 15,304 88.08 +16.08
st 12,522 88.03 +16.03
battle 6,344 87.98 +15.98
ny 6,337 87.97 +15.97
gop 24,482 87.75 +15.75
victim 6,473 87.74 +15.74
election 15,674 87.58 +15.58
george 6,997 87.52 +15.52
freedom 9,781 87.46 +15.46
fraud 6,269 87.46 +15.46
latest 13,380 87.44 +15.44
woman 40,607 87.27 +15.27
talks 7,454 87.25 +15.25
token count troll % points
ex 12,683 87.14 +15.14
killing 10,125 87.00 +15.00
speech 10,031 86.93 +14.92
defense 6,615 86.89 +14.89
lose 16,311 86.89 +14.89
tax 13,086 86.86 +14.86
missing 11,311 86.85 +14.85
attacks 9,359 86.77 +14.77
south 14,746 86.72 +14.72
lead 10,895 86.67 +14.67
investigation 8,577 86.61 +14.61
report 21,360 86.61 +14.60
court 19,274 86.56 +14.56
campaign 15,312 86.53 +14.53
muslim 12,764 86.50 +14.50
bernie 7,577 86.40 +14.40
man 102,054 86.38 +14.37
park 11,460 86.30 +14.30
says 53,886 86.24 +14.24
cancer 6,372 86.20 +14.20
fat 6,630 86.13 +14.13
wall 9,224 86.09 +14.08
black 54,695 86.04 +14.04
success 7,496 85.97 +13.97
street 9,396 85.94 +13.93
cnn 18,775 85.76 +13.76
lives 12,258 85.73 +13.73
prison 9,892 85.72 +13.72
military 10,831 85.65 +13.65
plan 15,547 85.60 +13.60
afraid 7,841 85.46 +13.45
la 11,180 85.45 +13.45
ahead 7,507 85.40 +13.39
war 17,051 85.38 +13.38
true 31,799 85.33 +13.33
city 29,167 85.31 +13.31
meeting 7,413 85.30 +13.30
victims 7,784 85.29 +13.28
potus 21,419 85.01 +13.01
problems 6,348 84.98 +12.98
david 6,813 84.98 +12.98
security 11,230 84.95 +12.95
voters 7,573 84.82 +12.82
gives 10,004 84.74 +12.74
iran 10,311 84.74 +12.74
return 6,828 84.73 +12.73
patriots 6,915 84.72 +12.72
attack 19,155 84.72 +12.72
fox 7,953 84.72 +12.72
donald 22,458 84.70 +12.70
national 15,611 84.57 +12.57
fall 11,075 84.55 +12.54
james 9,610 84.40 +12.40
trump 221,430 84.27 +12.27
after 102,962 84.24 +12.23
found 25,350 84.23 +12.23
fight 21,338 84.15 +12.15
takes 12,791 84.14 +12.14
game 28,181 84.02 +12.01
kill 13,098 84.00 +12.00
star 13,566 83.89 +11.89
hurt 10,659 83.76 +11.76
run 20,374 83.66 +11.65
2
token count troll % points
possible 8,769 83.65 +11.65
former 16,979 83.63 +11.63
leaders 6,978 83.57 +11.57
j 10,662 83.50 +11.50
https 67,955 83.45 +11.45
force 7,785 83.30 +11.29
race 11,948 83.23 +11.23
peace 8,816 83.21 +11.21
players 6,372 83.20 +11.20
case 18,632 83.16 +11.16
truth 17,734 83.06 +11.05
climate 6,536 82.98 +10.98
china 11,496 82.95 +10.95
may 34,566 82.91 +10.91
early 9,317 82.89 +10.89
hit 18,215 82.79 +10.79
chief 9,437 82.76 +10.76
among 6,656 82.76 +10.76
hits 7,319 82.71 +10.71
train 7,416 82.68 +10.68
york 11,358 82.67 +10.67
million 19,845 82.61 +10.61
control 10,746 82.58 +10.58
gets 21,234 82.44 +10.44
top 31,253 82.43 +10.43
video 57,773 82.42 +10.42
caught 7,387 82.40 +10.40
change 22,311 82.38 +10.37
service 8,834 82.26 +10.26
world 81,513 82.25 +10.24
worth 10,797 82.21 +10.21
five 6,912 82.20 +10.20
high 21,834 82.05 +10.05
htt 8,888 81.97 +9.97
rock 7,544 81.90 +9.90
money 35,021 81.72 +9.72
matter 15,758 81.66 +9.66
jobs 8,465 81.66 +9.66
beat 11,247 81.51 +9.51
monday 7,399 81.51 +9.50
against 36,139 81.43 +9.43
die 11,177 81.43 +9.43
year 48,396 81.37 +9.37
son 10,613 81.28 +9.28
winning 7,802 81.19 +9.19
rape 6,593 81.05 +9.05
trade 7,020 81.01 +9.01
mother 10,565 80.95 +8.95
dog 11,871 80.93 +8.93
died 7,172 80.89 +8.89
ft 6,478 80.88 +8.88
new 127,684 80.86 +8.86
saturday 6,740 80.78 +8.78
secret 7,678 80.72 +8.72
deal 19,520 80.72 +8.72
air 9,943 80.71 +8.70
life 68,278 80.69 +8.69
jail 8,085 80.66 +8.66
tv 10,859 80.63 +8.63
center 8,329 80.53 +8.53
policy 6,474 80.53 +8.53
broken 6,701 80.52 +8.52
vs 11,630 80.44 +8.44
token count troll % points
others 12,629 80.44 +8.44
community 7,431 80.36 +8.36
fake 16,503 80.33 +8.32
water 15,148 80.28 +8.27
goes 12,735 80.22 +8.22
general 6,636 80.16 +8.16
pro 8,575 80.16 +8.16
michael 7,544 80.06 +8.06
awesome 7,580 80.02 +8.02
white 48,934 79.98 +7.98
billion 6,276 79.95 +7.95
strong 9,418 79.95 +7.95
side 13,874 79.85 +7.85
past 10,724 79.84 +7.84
photos 10,058 79.83 +7.83
wake 7,202 79.70 +7.69
over 75,434 79.65 +7.65
dem 7,293 79.65 +7.65
federal 10,387 79.61 +7.61
sometimes 11,998 79.61 +7.61
win 27,376 79.59 +7.59
worst 8,659 79.58 +7.58
house 40,117 79.48 +7.48
inside 9,917 79.48 +7.48
antifa 11,002 79.47 +7.47
record 9,499 79.43 +7.43
america 46,709 79.35 +7.35
stand 14,803 79.33 +7.33
bank 6,904 79.28 +7.28
father 8,404 79.27 +7.27
makes 22,817 79.26 +7.26
late 8,409 79.15 +7.15
action 8,807 79.15 +7.15
during 20,503 79.12 +7.12
set 15,480 78.98 +6.98
walk 7,884 78.98 +6.98
friday 8,810 78.92 +6.92
justice 10,834 78.91 +6.91
released 6,486 78.90 +6.90
shows 13,257 78.88 +6.88
rules 6,943 78.87 +6.86
games 6,655 78.84 +6.84
food 11,659 78.83 +6.83
in 787,576 78.76 +6.76
fear 7,306 78.74 +6.74
wife 9,518 78.69 +6.69
major 8,007 78.65 +6.65
law 19,882 78.48 +6.48
cause 15,794 78.42 +6.42
body 12,571 78.38 +6.38
history 15,575 78.38 +6.38
al 9,510 78.33 +6.33
future 11,040 78.32 +6.32
issues 6,324 78.30 +6.30
tells 7,240 78.30 +6.29
special 11,234 78.20 +6.20
media 32,570 78.15 +6.15
system 8,210 78.12 +6.12
home 31,332 78.11 +6.11
leader 9,516 78.11 +6.10
old 37,111 78.10 +6.10
visit 7,747 78.10 +6.10
cat 6,682 78.06 +6.05
3
token count troll % points
via 42,667 78.02 +6.01
political 10,352 78.00 +6.00
terrorist 7,819 77.86 +5.86
lies 7,411 77.85 +5.85
pay 14,083 77.85 +5.85
ryan 7,571 77.84 +5.84
power 19,070 77.83 +5.83
facebook 8,874 77.81 +5.81
paul 9,201 77.74 +5.74
open 17,325 77.73 +5.73
due 6,349 77.71 +5.71
break 11,063 77.63 +5.63
public 12,316 77.48 +5.48
family 23,461 77.41 +5.41
behind 11,542 77.41 +5.41
republicans 9,372 77.36 +5.36
americans 16,956 77.33 +5.33
live 36,996 77.30 +5.30
must 27,337 77.27 +5.27
without 23,115 77.23 +5.23
rights 11,062 77.22 +5.22
running 9,733 77.22 +5.22
office 11,642 77.22 +5.21
ht 7,885 77.19 +5.19
meet 11,595 77.19 +5.19
road 8,897 77.12 +5.12
class 7,148 77.07 +5.06
town 7,303 77.06 +5.06
step 6,523 76.95 +4.95
sexual 6,513 76.95 +4.95
safe 8,300 76.95 +4.95
de 7,264 76.94 +4.93
problem 10,742 76.91 +4.91
mind 15,619 76.91 +4.91
become 11,579 76.90 +4.90
face 19,493 76.88 +4.88
season 10,869 76.81 +4.81
second 12,286 76.75 +4.75
won 27,779 76.73 +4.73
down 47,488 76.73 +4.73
cut 8,053 76.71 +4.71
head 15,218 76.70 +4.70
low 6,473 76.67 +4.67
wants 17,774 76.65 +4.64
questions 7,067 76.58 +4.57
line 9,890 76.57 +4.57
joe 6,408 76.56 +4.55
self 9,469 76.55 +4.55
under 18,868 76.51 +4.51
government 16,776 76.50 +4.50
outside 8,773 76.45 +4.44
lost 14,791 76.43 +4.43
three 12,467 76.37 +4.37
turn 10,691 76.37 +4.37
two 32,482 76.35 +4.35
anti 17,497 76.29 +4.29
great 39,449 76.29 +4.29
art 9,952 76.28 +4.28
happened 9,731 76.28 +4.28
make 69,954 76.26 +4.26
dems 11,912 76.25 +4.24
storm 6,779 76.25 +4.24
perfect 9,805 76.17 +4.17
token count troll % points
series 6,861 76.11 +4.11
comes 11,174 76.06 +4.06
list 9,810 76.06 +4.06
paid 7,217 76.04 +4.04
move 11,023 76.03 +4.03
job 16,927 76.00 +4.00
trust 8,032 75.97 +3.96
into 45,123 75.89 +3.89
nothing 27,402 75.89 +3.89
off 43,924 75.88 +3.88
daughter 6,741 75.87 +3.87
things 32,807 75.84 +3.84
sign 10,251 75.84 +3.84
un 7,659 75.83 +3.83
believe 23,945 75.82 +3.82
super 10,044 75.71 +3.71
join 13,033 75.70 +3.70
republican 9,650 75.68 +3.68
stay 15,581 75.66 +3.66
save 9,842 75.64 +3.64
brown 6,612 75.60 +3.60
away 22,743 75.59 +3.59
mark 6,598 75.58 +3.58
company 6,718 75.57 +3.57
shut 8,090 75.55 +3.54
learn 9,322 75.53 +3.52
ones 7,694 75.39 +3.39
red 9,928 75.35 +3.35
mueller 7,721 75.33 +3.33
chance 8,579 75.33 +3.33
daily 7,681 75.32 +3.32
mexico 6,865 75.32 +3.32
cover 6,728 75.26 +3.26
could 37,724 75.20 +3.20
weekend 9,920 75.19 +3.19
release 7,500 75.17 +3.17
stupid 9,934 75.15 +3.15
than 60,234 75.11 +3.11
care 24,974 75.11 +3.11
wrong 17,647 75.11 +3.11
small 9,148 75.08 +3.08
light 8,178 75.07 +3.07
happen 9,389 75.03 +3.03
issue 6,622 74.96 +2.96
eat 9,964 74.93 +2.93
at 232,479 74.93 +2.92
watch 35,667 74.92 +2.92
american 32,493 74.84 +2.83
gay 8,028 74.83 +2.83
lying 6,403 74.74 +2.74
child 15,201 74.73 +2.73
hell 12,488 74.72 +2.72
s 659,166 74.65 +2.64
n 21,252 74.53 +2.53
himself 6,990 74.43 +2.43
end 21,657 74.42 +2.42
never 63,784 74.42 +2.42
words 12,962 74.40 +2.40
dream 8,638 74.26 +2.26
thinks 6,294 74.24 +2.24
deep 6,396 74.23 +2.23
young 13,131 74.20 +2.20
israel 7,129 74.20 +2.20
4
token count troll % points
co 7,743 74.11 +2.11
more 98,676 74.11 +2.11
for 534,952 74.11 +2.11
times 16,653 74.05 +2.05
us 87,455 73.97 +1.97
play 17,237 73.95 +1.95
between 11,695 73.95 +1.95
another 27,838 73.94 +1.94
tomorrow 11,211 73.86 +1.86
press 8,031 73.82 +1.82
work 30,182 73.82 +1.82
mom 11,831 73.81 +1.81
cannot 8,506 73.75 +1.75
to 1,201,900 73.74 +1.74
close 9,742 73.74 +1.74
tried 7,355 73.73 +1.73
take 43,665 73.72 +1.72
crazy 8,166 73.67 +1.66
place 13,920 73.66 +1.66
women 34,276 73.56 +1.56
king 9,986 73.53 +1.53
everything 22,127 73.48 +1.48
alone 8,236 73.44 +1.44
before 32,136 73.43 +1.43
by 148,300 73.42 +1.42
find 23,049 73.38 +1.38
long 22,337 73.37 +1.37
lie 8,617 73.34 +1.34
big 30,027 73.31 +1.30
least 10,995 73.29 +1.29
try 16,730 73.28 +1.28
app 7,315 73.26 +1.25
moment 10,655 73.25 +1.25
on 401,509 73.20 +1.20
start 19,397 73.18 +1.18
real 29,643 73.17 +1.17
wanted 10,987 73.16 +1.16
day 67,552 73.13 +1.13
president 57,943 73.08 +1.08
say 54,576 73.05 +1.05
will 143,648 72.97 +0.97
left 24,848 72.96 +0.96
doesn 28,058 72.90 +0.90
music 24,237 72.89 +0.89
pick 6,969 72.85 +0.84
sick 8,397 72.84 +0.84
forget 13,037 72.84 +0.84
mike 7,786 72.83 +0.83
message 6,972 72.83 +0.83
week 22,192 72.82 +0.82
huge 6,648 72.81 +0.81
official 10,532 72.75 +0.75
through 18,927 72.74 +0.74
call 22,671 72.71 +0.71
again 37,164 72.71 +0.70
night 22,315 72.66 +0.66
of 717,733 72.64 +0.63
kids 16,278 72.55 +0.55
bring 10,345 72.52 +0.52
easy 6,488 72.47 +0.47
living 8,315 72.43 +0.43
protect 7,262 72.41 +0.41
smile 8,217 72.38 +0.38
token count troll % points
better 31,185 72.37 +0.37
people 121,907 72.35 +0.35
next 23,286 72.28 +0.28
photo 10,025 72.26 +0.26
men 23,971 72.23 +0.23
sunday 8,722 72.21 +0.21
bad 23,427 72.21 +0.21
important 9,616 72.19 +0.19
tonight 12,448 72.18 +0.18
love 109,820 72.15 +0.15
help 31,478 72.13 +0.13
parents 8,709 72.07 +0.07
short 7,036 72.07 +0.07
enough 15,985 72.06 +0.06
order 9,756 72.04 +0.04
something 27,438 72.04 +0.04
with 274,393 72.01 +0.01
act 9,905 72.00 +0.00
first 51,218 72.00 +0.00
racism 11,370 71.98 -0.01
fighting 8,094 71.96 -0.03
ll 45,012 71.95 -0.04
hold 10,304 71.94 -0.05
years 34,737 71.92 -0.07
show 30,461 71.90 -0.09
taking 10,976 71.89 -0.10
eyes 9,885 71.84 -0.15
u 79,009 71.76 -0.23
own 24,861 71.76 -0.23
what 175,889 71.74 -0.25
right 52,202 71.69 -0.30
crisis 7,740 71.69 -0.30
fast 6,626 71.64 -0.35
four 9,683 71.64 -0.36
cool 7,881 71.56 -0.43
wish 11,055 71.56 -0.44
heard 9,141 71.55 -0.44
best 43,638 71.55 -0.45
gone 8,846 71.53 -0.46
stop 37,826 71.51 -0.48
kim 7,084 71.48 -0.51
loves 6,309 71.46 -0.53
story 15,836 71.44 -0.55
blue 7,113 71.43 -0.56
as 149,723 71.39 -0.61
taken 6,455 71.38 -0.61
needs 14,381 71.31 -0.68
ready 13,741 71.31 -0.68
look 44,767 71.31 -0.68
up 124,788 71.28 -0.71
less 9,167 71.27 -0.72
from 156,218 71.21 -0.78
following 8,005 71.20 -0.79
boy 16,218 71.15 -0.84
still 46,970 71.10 -0.89
continue 6,363 71.03 -0.96
use 20,290 71.01 -0.98
knows 8,119 70.99 -1.00
biggest 6,765 70.98 -1.01
ppl 8,438 70.97 -1.02
need 57,495 70.96 -1.03
poor 6,551 70.95 -1.05
heart 19,254 70.93 -1.06
5
token count troll % points
reason 11,308 70.92 -1.07
days 18,488 70.89 -1.10
understand 11,466 70.87 -1.12
dad 6,415 70.83 -1.16
lol 24,693 70.81 -1.18
be 239,919 70.80 -1.19
no 128,801 70.74 -1.25
person 24,871 70.71 -1.28
immigration 10,053 70.65 -1.34
rich 6,800 70.64 -1.35
means 8,867 70.58 -1.41
half 7,949 70.54 -1.45
buy 11,010 70.43 -1.56
does 27,887 70.39 -1.60
mad 7,984 70.37 -1.62
gave 8,416 70.33 -1.67
t 368,688 70.31 -1.68
nation 7,750 70.27 -1.73
way 42,701 70.26 -1.73
wouldn 6,689 70.23 -1.76
who 149,564 70.23 -1.76
d 36,942 70.22 -1.77
else 12,363 70.20 -1.79
minutes 6,884 70.20 -1.79
about 131,104 70.17 -1.82
nowplaying 8,453 70.17 -1.82
agree 9,609 70.12 -1.87
looks 16,325 70.08 -1.91
not 210,466 70.07 -1.92
support 22,878 70.07 -1.92
book 11,170 70.02 -1.97
rest 7,341 70.00 -1.99
phone 8,530 69.97 -2.02
keep 27,964 69.97 -2.02
funny 10,398 69.96 -2.03
little 21,766 69.93 -2.06
hands 6,905 69.83 -2.16
while 25,338 69.81 -2.18
out 117,249 69.77 -2.22
hope 20,879 69.77 -2.22
nice 12,519 69.76 -2.23
idea 7,561 69.76 -2.23
age 6,498 69.75 -2.24
hard 19,463 69.75 -2.24
called 17,194 69.72 -2.27
time 80,339 69.70 -2.29
give 29,400 69.69 -2.30
hate 26,690 69.69 -2.30
children 18,215 69.68 -2.31
don 125,595 69.65 -2.34
later 6,431 69.63 -2.36
should 49,120 69.62 -2.37
wonder 6,693 69.62 -2.37
looking 16,646 69.58 -2.41
until 13,327 69.56 -2.43
group 13,409 69.55 -2.44
get 101,518 69.55 -2.44
word 10,098 69.51 -2.48
congress 15,208 69.50 -2.49
final 8,827 69.46 -2.53
month 7,839 69.43 -2.56
w 24,856 69.43 -2.56
respect 7,061 69.39 -2.60
token count troll % points
can 163,704 69.38 -2.61
party 20,960 69.33 -2.66
team 16,127 69.29 -2.70
online 8,298 69.28 -2.71
always 35,321 69.24 -2.75
girl 25,745 69.18 -2.81
post 17,267 69.16 -2.83
states 11,801 69.12 -2.88
myself 9,747 69.08 -2.91
human 10,963 69.07 -2.92
there 78,019 69.06 -2.93
o 17,221 69.05 -2.94
good 67,893 69.03 -2.96
flag 8,518 69.01 -2.98
working 11,090 69.01 -2.98
trying 20,930 69.01 -2.99
got 46,612 68.96 -3.03
too 48,058 68.96 -3.04
c 16,086 68.86 -3.13
is 605,936 68.86 -3.13
thing 26,671 68.79 -3.20
put 19,328 68.75 -3.24
around 17,405 68.65 -3.34
every 36,235 68.61 -3.38
someone 34,734 68.58 -3.41
those 28,402 68.56 -3.43
waiting 7,058 68.56 -3.44
sex 17,312 68.54 -3.45
cry 6,804 68.53 -3.46
god 32,541 68.48 -3.51
free 29,637 68.47 -3.52
room 7,710 68.46 -3.53
gotta 7,628 68.41 -3.58
only 61,076 68.41 -3.58
it 418,877 68.40 -3.59
anything 16,498 68.39 -3.61
a 809,249 68.31 -3.69
making 15,359 68.29 -3.70
using 10,448 68.26 -3.73
our 93,644 68.18 -3.81
baby 18,196 68.15 -3.84
thanks 17,954 68.15 -3.84
made 27,773 68.09 -3.90
most 35,493 68.04 -3.95
your 187,607 68.01 -3.98
used 12,964 68.01 -3.98
the 1,360,727 67.93 -4.06
going 42,230 67.88 -4.11
tell 25,568 67.87 -4.12
yourself 17,953 67.86 -4.13
why 68,491 67.83 -4.16
ain 10,746 67.80 -4.19
morning 20,276 67.78 -4.21
last 28,236 67.74 -4.25
l 9,980 67.74 -4.25
leave 15,711 67.59 -4.40
clear 6,323 67.57 -4.42
think 52,491 67.57 -4.42
isn 17,356 67.56 -4.43
forever 6,376 67.51 -4.48
its 30,168 67.50 -4.49
are 253,816 67.50 -4.49
ask 13,041 67.45 -4.54
6
token count troll % points
youtube 10,232 67.45 -4.54
feel 23,630 67.43 -4.56
army 11,632 67.42 -4.57
amp 130,858 67.38 -4.61
friend 14,777 67.37 -4.62
miss 13,041 67.37 -4.62
one 114,211 67.29 -4.70
democrat 8,898 67.28 -4.71
wanna 16,971 67.27 -4.72
has 98,794 67.27 -4.73
wow 11,273 67.14 -4.85
do 123,663 67.14 -4.86
would 56,904 67.13 -4.86
finally 9,607 67.12 -4.87
when 122,781 67.11 -4.88
k 7,784 67.08 -4.91
you 647,202 67.01 -4.98
let 51,469 66.99 -5.00
far 11,319 66.87 -5.12
how 111,908 66.85 -5.14
fun 10,548 66.84 -5.15
being 49,176 66.77 -5.22
remember 18,856 66.75 -5.24
tired 6,900 66.73 -5.26
ya 7,286 66.71 -5.28
knew 7,316 66.70 -5.29
summer 10,868 66.60 -5.39
we 215,205 66.52 -5.47
feeling 6,996 66.46 -5.53
aren 7,849 66.37 -5.62
instead 8,217 66.37 -5.62
movie 9,326 66.34 -5.65
p 10,203 66.30 -5.69
guess 7,577 66.18 -5.81
soon 10,295 66.17 -5.82
just 149,329 66.17 -5.82
talk 15,856 66.12 -5.87
might 11,033 66.11 -5.88
read 18,096 66.11 -5.88
amazing 11,410 66.11 -5.88
done 17,940 66.11 -5.88
f 12,921 66.07 -5.92
months 7,404 66.05 -5.94
wasn 8,057 66.02 -5.97
hear 11,852 66.01 -5.98
sleep 10,259 65.99 -6.01
welcome 6,474 65.97 -6.02
want 68,601 65.95 -6.04
know 77,243 65.91 -6.08
well 30,060 65.90 -6.09
but 151,964 65.89 -6.10
playing 15,754 65.88 -6.11
giving 7,814 65.86 -6.13
uk 7,055 65.79 -6.20
go 67,916 65.79 -6.20
share 9,246 65.67 -6.32
took 10,387 65.60 -6.40
sad 10,835 65.57 -6.42
coming 16,108 65.54 -6.45
yet 13,122 65.53 -6.46
all 172,300 65.53 -6.46
re 87,384 65.50 -6.49
his 104,995 65.47 -6.52
token count troll % points
now 93,117 65.42 -6.57
once 12,339 65.40 -6.59
had 41,450 65.36 -6.64
have 176,922 65.34 -6.65
an 94,129 65.32 -6.67
vote 28,634 65.32 -6.68
back 59,686 65.32 -6.68
some 49,705 65.29 -6.71
h 14,897 65.28 -6.71
ever 32,277 65.20 -6.79
almost 7,849 65.16 -6.83
today 49,176 65.12 -6.87
name 15,026 65.10 -6.89
question 9,531 65.09 -6.90
didn 23,700 65.02 -6.97
kind 8,895 64.96 -7.03
that 331,146 64.95 -7.04
hours 8,449 64.82 -7.17
though 7,502 64.82 -7.17
happy 31,460 64.81 -7.18
come 29,820 64.80 -7.19
haven 6,469 64.80 -7.19
much 38,111 64.77 -7.22
r 16,112 64.65 -7.34
or 80,103 64.64 -7.35
where 32,098 64.64 -7.35
any 29,303 64.52 -7.47
rt 1,843,554 64.44 -7.55
because 49,141 64.42 -7.57
nobody 8,331 64.36 -7.63
calling 8,351 64.33 -7.66
point 11,477 64.31 -7.69
same 24,147 64.29 -7.70
democrats 19,245 64.27 -7.73
democratic 6,541 64.22 -7.77
getting 19,550 64.21 -7.78
doing 20,397 64.20 -7.80
already 13,725 64.17 -7.82
m 123,396 64.16 -7.83
b 14,951 64.13 -7.86
friends 17,906 64.09 -7.90
if 144,827 64.09 -7.90
guy 13,265 64.05 -7.94
mean 14,145 63.96 -8.03
yesterday 6,763 63.90 -8.09
then 37,207 63.87 -8.12
e 10,646 63.81 -8.18
probably 7,530 63.78 -8.21
drop 6,485 63.77 -8.22
damn 9,981 63.77 -8.23
maybe 10,477 63.74 -8.25
gonna 17,350 63.71 -8.28
even 39,189 63.70 -8.29
see 57,554 63.68 -8.31
thought 13,694 63.64 -8.35
seen 11,770 63.57 -8.42
part 16,253 63.57 -8.42
together 11,343 63.50 -8.49
oh 22,480 63.31 -8.68
hand 9,049 63.28 -8.71
their 70,277 63.26 -8.73
pretty 10,984 63.25 -8.74
such 12,246 63.24 -8.75
7
token count troll % points
were 37,777 63.23 -8.76
beautiful 16,087 63.21 -8.78
and 615,184 63.19 -8.80
g 6,697 63.14 -8.85
really 46,587 63.14 -8.85
thinking 7,999 63.13 -8.86
wait 13,709 63.03 -8.96
administration 6,298 63.00 -8.99
other 30,643 62.95 -9.05
check 15,895 62.90 -9.09
united 10,621 62.90 -9.09
girls 14,579 62.87 -9.13
was 145,692 62.87 -9.13
fan 6,911 62.84 -9.15
since 16,200 62.83 -9.16
did 41,708 62.82 -9.17
full 13,839 62.75 -9.24
hot 11,219 62.68 -9.31
ve 37,895 62.64 -9.35
started 8,000 62.56 -9.43
global 6,481 62.28 -9.71
watching 8,546 62.27 -9.72
i 730,059 62.25 -9.74
like 136,660 62.16 -9.83
listen 12,352 62.12 -9.87
country 28,156 62.08 -9.91
exactly 7,680 62.00 -9.99
fans 9,772 61.93 -10.06
illegal 12,128 61.92 -10.07
favorite 7,505 61.89 -10.10
proud 8,019 61.82 -10.17
sure 14,730 61.81 -10.18
they 163,815 61.57 -10.43
dear 8,572 61.52 -10.47
them 61,702 61.51 -10.48
absolutely 6,800 61.44 -10.56
each 10,292 61.43 -10.56
very 25,328 61.35 -10.64
which 21,143 61.23 -10.76
single 10,248 61.21 -10.78
social 10,822 61.18 -10.82
her 75,538 61.05 -10.94
having 13,173 61.01 -10.98
mr 6,695 61.00 -11.00
few 8,881 60.82 -11.17
both 11,959 60.67 -11.32
talking 10,790 60.54 -11.45
many 29,765 60.50 -11.50
fact 10,185 60.45 -11.54
lot 13,395 60.44 -11.56
he 161,802 60.39 -11.60
me 177,149 60.36 -11.64
these 40,456 60.24 -11.75
yeah 10,421 60.17 -11.82
born 7,673 60.05 -11.94
speak 8,425 59.95 -12.04
am 33,420 59.83 -12.16
my 228,066 59.80 -12.19
him 49,829 59.74 -12.25
actually 15,118 59.59 -12.40
anyone 16,241 59.57 -12.42
told 12,431 59.32 -12.67
here 60,018 59.26 -12.73
token count troll % points
saw 8,566 59.23 -12.76
voting 8,590 59.20 -12.79
ago 10,018 59.16 -12.83
she 77,832 59.07 -12.93
rep 6,555 58.94 -13.05
hey 11,803 58.69 -13.30
been 46,964 58.61 -13.38
gt 29,458 58.52 -13.48
boys 6,949 58.42 -13.57
so 152,058 58.33 -13.66
hair 7,654 58.23 -13.77
send 7,958 58.14 -13.85
different 8,190 57.98 -14.01
went 10,461 57.84 -14.15
saying 13,655 57.60 -14.39
birthday 9,100 57.59 -14.40
twitter 26,621 57.49 -14.50
area 16,104 57.48 -14.51
everyone 25,940 57.28 -14.71
said 36,134 57.23 -14.76
asked 8,457 57.11 -14.88
this 302,011 57.07 -14.93
immigrants 6,633 57.01 -14.98
members 8,769 56.99 -15.00
th 9,409 56.66 -15.33
sorry 10,306 56.60 -15.39
yes 18,162 55.99 -16.00
ok 10,284 55.70 -16.29
realdonaldtrump 48,122 55.64 -16.35
shit 22,061 55.24 -16.75
whole 13,573 54.65 -17.34
lt 7,778 54.42 -17.57
number 6,846 54.36 -17.63
ass 13,206 54.11 -17.88
song 11,566 53.95 -18.05
also 20,748 53.91 -18.08
border 11,553 53.08 -18.91
telling 6,416 52.89 -19.10
tweet 16,298 52.81 -19.18
omg 9,763 52.05 -19.94
tweets 11,292 51.78 -20.22
imagine 6,749 51.05 -20.94
update 6,869 50.74 -21.25
thank 27,529 50.26 -21.73
came 9,749 49.56 -22.43
x 7,194 49.48 -22.51
account 6,902 49.10 -22.89
racist 22,383 48.70 -23.29
please 33,088 47.88 -24.11
guys 12,199 47.83 -24.16
album 6,495 47.57 -24.42
fuck 16,605 47.32 -24.67
fucking 11,252 47.09 -24.90
bitch 8,767 46.99 -25.00
tour 8,170 46.63 -25.36
cute 9,526 46.54 -25.45
follow 22,185 46.23 -25.76
ur 9,018 45.87 -26.12
okay 7,780 44.57 -27.42
retweet 14,221 41.83 -30.16
dont 7,737 40.85 -31.14
y 18,360 39.84 -32.15
ice 13,589 39.52 -32.47
8
token count troll % points
literally 8,362 39.27 -32.72
july 9,686 37.35 -34.64
im 16,296 37.23 -34.76
followers 11,972 30.06 -41.93
epstein 8,373 2.41 -69.58
bts 11,879 1.10 -70.89
exo 7,737 0.33 -71.66
aoc 9,821 0.01 -71.99
bts twt 10,967 0.00 -71.99
mgmavote 10,389 0.00 -72.00
9
